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IT'S NOT EASY BEING GREEN: METROPOLITAN TAXICAB
REVEALS HURDLES POSED BY FEDERAL
PREEMPTION TO STATE AND LOCAL
ENVIRONMENTAL INITIATIVES

I.

INTRODUCTION

Being green has never before been so popular.1 From the supermarket to the office park, and from the classroom to the con2
struction site, a wave of environmentalism is sweeping the nation.
The justifications for going "green" range from the selfish to the
altruistic: cutting energy costs during hard economic times, mitigating the country's dependence on foreign oil, and combating cli3
mate change through the reduction of so-called carbon footprints.
Regardless of why many Americans are becoming environmentally
conscious, scientists welcome this behavioral shift because of the
4
harmful implications of maintaining the status quo.
1. For examples of the increasing popularity of environmentally friendly behavior, see infra note 2.
2. See, e.g., Andrew Martin, Whole Foods Chain to Stop Use of Plastic Bags, N.Y.
TiMES, Jan. 23, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/O1/23/business/23bags.
html?fta=y (reporting supermarket chain's decision to offer customers only recycled paper or reusable grocery bags); Bryan Walsh, The Four-Day Workweek is Winning Fans,TIME, Sept. 7, 2009, http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,91
71,1919162,00.html (describing how Utah's government offices being closed on
Fridays reduces energy costs and cuts greenhouse gas emissions); Laurie Tarkan,
Where Green Gets High Marks, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 26, 2009, http://query.nytimes.com/
gst/fullpage.html?res=9B07EODF143DF935A15757COA96F9C8B63
(recounting
one elementary school's efforts to reduce waste, save energy, and recycle supplies);
Abby Gruen, Trend in Green Building Accelerates in Westchester, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16,
2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/18/nyregion/westchester/18greenwe.
html (detailing green building trend within one New York county).
3. See FuelEconomy.gov, Why is Fuel Economy Important?, http://fuel
economy.gov/feg/why.shtml (last visited Feb. 28, 2010) (suggesting various reasons to be aware of vehicle fuel efficiency).
4. See, e.g., U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Climate Change Frequent Questions Effects, http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/fq/effects.html#q3 (last visited Feb.
28, 2010) (enumerating likely detrimental consequences of climate change).
Warming global temperatures are expected to have a predominately negative impact on biodiversity, with some ecosystems already affected. Id. In terms of human
health, more heat-related deaths and illness, as well as a higher incidence of insectborne disease, may result from climate change. Id. Rising sea levels, caused by
melting glaciers, may contribute to enhanced coastal erosion and an increased risk
of property loss from storm surges. Id. Moreover, scientists expect climate change
to cause an increase in the number of heat waves, more intense hurricanes, and a
greater likelihood of floods and droughts. Id.

(325)
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One notable place where individuals are increasingly going
green is America's roadways, which have long allowed personal automobiles to be the greatest polluter in cities nationwide. 5 According to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), "[d] riving
a private car is probably a typical citizen's most 'polluting' daily activity" between the vehicle's exhaust and the evaporation of its
fuel. 6 Burning fossil fuels, such as gasoline and diesel, releases carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases into the atmosphere that
contribute to climate change. 7 Consequently, the emissions from
passenger cars and trucks account for at least one-fifth of U.S. carbon dioxide emissions and nearly one-third of the country's total
air pollution. 8 Although efforts by the federal government and automotive industry have greatly reduced vehicle emissions since
1970, this progress has been effectively wiped out as the number of
miles driven by Americans doubled during the same period. 9
One widely embraced solution to this dilemma is hybrid-electric vehicles (hybrids), which have greater fuel economy and lower
emissions than conventional automobiles because they utilize both
a gasoline engine and an electric motor. 10 Since the first hybrid car
5. See OFFICE OF MOBILE SOURCES, U.S. ENvrL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA 400-F-92007, AUTOMOBILE EMISSIONS: AN OVERVIEW 1 (1994), http://www.epa.gov/otaq/
consumer/05-autos.pdf [hereinafter AUTOMOBILE EMISSIONS] (describing relationship between cars and pollution).
6. Id. (reiterating link between driving and pollution).
7. See FuelEconomy.gov, Reduce Climate Change, http://www.fueleconomy.
gov/feg/climate.shtml (last visited Feb. 28, 2010) (explaining connection between
driving, greenhouse gas emissions, and climate change).
8. See OFFICE OF TRANSP. & AIR QUALITY, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA 420F-01-006, GREEN VEHICLE GUIDE 1 (2001), http://www.epa.gov/otaq/consumer/
f01006.pdf (quantifying aggregate pollution from American cars and trucks).
Trucks include pickups, minivans, vans and sport utility vehicles. Id.
9. See AUTOMOBILE EMISSIONS, supra note 5, at 4 (describing limited progress

of emission controls to date). On-road carbon monoxide emissions are less than
half of what they were in 1970 and five times less than they would have been without the controls that have been implemented since then. See U.S. Envtl. Prot.
Agency, On-Road Sources, http://www.epa.gov/otaq/invntory/overview/results/
onroad.htm (last visited Feb. 28, 2010) (depicting impact of regulatory controls on
on-road vehicle emissions). EPA studies also show that today's cars emit seventy to
ninety percent less pollution for each mile driven than their 1970 counterparts as a
result of advancements in vehicle and fuel technology. See U.S. Envtl. Prot.
Agency, Solutions that Reduce Pollution, http://www.epa.gov/otaq/invntory/
overview/solutions/vechengines.htm (last visited Feb. 28, 2010) (applauding
technological improvements for reducing vehicle emissions).
10. See FuelEconomy.gov, How Hybrids Work, http://www.fueleconomy.gov/
feg/hybridtech.shtml (last visited Feb. 28, 2010) (explaining technology behind
hybrid-electric vehicles). While gas-electric hybrids are the most popular fuel-efficient vehicles, car companies are also actively developing and marketing entirely
electric cars as well as plug-in hybrids. See Hiroko Tabuchi, Industry Slumps, but
Prius Inspires Waiting List, N.Y. TIMES, June 12, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/
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became commercially available in the U.S. in 1999, over 1.5 million
hybrids have been sold, and manufacturers expect continued
growth in this sector of the otherwise-distressed automotive industry.11 Federal tax incentives have encouraged the sale of hybrids
since the mid-2000s, but many of these programs have since ended
or are being phased out without decreasing the vehicles' popularity
12
among consumers.
Despite the current strength of the environmental movement,
the road to going green is a bumpy one, riddled with legislative
potholes, influential pedestrians and other obstacles slowing the
country's progress.1 3 Environmental initiatives of cities and states,
in particular, have been hindered by recent court decisions finding
these efforts preempted by federal law. 14 One such case is Metropolitan Taxicab Board of Trade v. City of New York (Metropolitan Taxicab),15
in which the District Court for the Southern District of New York

2009/06/13/business/global/13prius.html [hereinafter Industry Slumps] (describing Toyota's market strategy regarding hybrids).
11. See HybridCars.com, November 2009 Dashboard: 10th Anniversary of US
Hybrid Market, Dec. 11, 2009, http://www.hybridcars.com/hybrid-sales-dashboard/november-2009-dashboard.html (estimating total number of hybrids currently on U.S. roads). Although the world's first mass-produced hybrid-electric
vehicle, the Toyota Prius, became available in Japan in 1997, it did not hit the U.S.
market until the year after the U.S. release of the Honda Insight in 1999. See
HybridCars.com, History of Hybrid Vehicles, Mar. 27, 2006, http://
www.hybridcars.com/history/history-of-hybrid-vehicles.html (providing timeline of
events related to hybrid vehicles). One auto analyst recently projected that global
sales of eco-friendly vehicles could grow from 0.8 million in 2009 to 11.2 million in
2020. See Hiroko Tabuchi, Toyota to Sell Plug-In Hybrid in 2011, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14,
2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/15/business/global/I5toyota.html
(describing expert predictions of changes within auto industry).
12. See generally FuelEconomy.gov, New Energy Tax Credits for Hybrids, http:/
/www.fueleconomy.gov/feg/tax-hybrid.shtml (last visited Feb. 28, 2010) (supplying deadlines and other pertinent information about government tax credits). Although Prius sales are down sharply from when gasoline prices topped $4 per
gallon, waiting lists accumulated at some U.S. car dealers for Toyota's newest Prius
model for more than a year. See Industy Slumps, supra note 10. Hybrid sales in
November 2009 accounted for 2.8% of total U.S. car sales and were 21% higher
than a year earlier despite growth in the overall market remaining essentially flat.
See HybridCars.com, November 2009 Dashboard: 10th Anniversary of US Hybrid
Market, Dec. 11, 2009, http://www.hybridcars.com/hybrid-sales-dashboard/november-2009-dashboard.html (comparing annual hybrids sales).
13. For a discussion of the hurdles faced by state and local environmental
initiatives, see infra notes 172-82 and accompanying text.
14. See, e.g., Engine Mfrs. Ass'n v. S. Coast Air Quality Mgmt. Dist., 541 U.S. 246
(2004) (finding state motor vehicle pollution standards preempted by Clean Air
Act); Ophir v. City of Boston, 647 F. Supp. 2d 86 (D. Mass. 2009) (finding local fuel
efficiency ordinance preempted by Energy Policy and Conservation Act).
15. 633 F. Supp. 2d 83 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
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struck down the city's attempt to move toward exclusively hybrid
taxicabs. 16
This Note evaluates the district court's decision in Metropolitan
Taxicab and reflects on its implications for state and local environmental initiatives. Part II discusses the factual background and procedural history of this case. 17 Part III provides an overview of two
pertinent federal statutes, the doctrine of preemption, and the limited amount of applicable case law.' 8 Part IV describes the district
court's reasoning in Metropolitan Taxicab.19 Part V scrutinizes the
outcome of this case and explains why the court's overall decision
was sound even though particular points could have been addressed in greater detail.20 Finally, Part VI predicts the impact that
this decision will have on environmental federalism and suggests
various courses of action still available to cities and states following
21
Metropolitan Taxicab.
II.

FACTS

In 2003, New York City first acted to incorporate hybrid vehicles into its taxicab fleet by enacting a law permitting the city's Taxicab and Limousine Commission (TLC) to issue additional taxicab
licenses if at least nine percent were granted to fuel-efficient vehicles. 2 2 The TLC only began approving hybrids for use as taxicabs in
16. See Michael M. Grynbaum, Judge Blocks City's Penaltyfor Nonhybrid Cab Owners, N.Y. TIMES, June 22, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/O6/23/nyregion/
23taxi.html (relating decision of U.S. District Judge Paul A. Crotty striking down
New York City's most recent taxicab regulations).
17. For a further discussion of the facts of Metropolitan Taxicab, see infra notes
22-52 and accompanying text.
18. For a further discussion of the legal background applicable to Metropolitan
Taxicab, see infra notes 53-104 and accompanying text.
19. For a narrative analysis of the court's decision, see infra notes 105-34 and
accompanying text.
20. For a critical analysis of the court's decision in Metropolitan Taxicab, see
infra notes 135-61 and accompanying text.
21. For a further discussion of the potential impact of this case, see infra notes
162-82 and accompanying text.
22. See Opinion & Order, Metro. Taxicab Bd. of Trade v. City of New York, No. 08
Civ. 7837 (PAC), 2008 WL 4866021, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 31, 2008) (portraying
history of city's efforts to have more hybrid taxicabs). Created in 1971, the TLC "is
the agency responsible for licensing and regulating New York City's medallion (yellow) taxicabs, for-hire vehicles (community-based liveries and black cars), commuter vans, paratransit vehicles (ambulettes) and certain luxury limousines." New
York City Taxi & Limousine Commission, About TLC, http://www.nyc.gov/html/
tlc/html/about/about.shtml (last visited Feb. 28, 2010) (describing functions of
TLC). According to the city's Charter, one purpose of the TLC is to establish an
overall public transportation policy governing the vehicles under its purview. See
Metro. Taxicab, 2008 WL 4866021, at *2. The TLC notably has the power to set
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October 2005, however, after adopting new requirements regarding
interior room. 23 On May 22, 2007, one month after introducing a
broad package of environmental initiatives dubbed "PlaNYC 2030,"
Mayor Michael Bloomberg announced that the city planned to turn
its taxicab fleet completely hybrid by 2012.24 While nearly 1,500 of

the city's 13,237 yellow taxicabs were already hybrids, the remainder consisted primarily of Ford's Crown Victoria model, which averages twelve to fourteen miles per gallon (mpg).25
The TLC accordingly adopted new rules (25/30 Rules) on December 11, 2007, that established minimum fuel economy requirements for all new taxicabs. 26 These rules called for new taxicabs to
be either wheelchair accessible or to have a minimum city rating of
twenty-five mpg by October 1, 2008, with a scheduled increase to
thirty mpg by October 1, 2009.27 While the 25/30 Rules did not

explicitly require a switch to hybrids, only vehicles with hybrid-electric or clean diesel engines were capable of meeting these minimum mileage requirements. 28 With mandatory retirement for New
York City taxicabs every three to five years, depending on use, the
TLC regulations would have resulted in a virtually all-hybrid taxicab
fleet by 2012.29

Shortly before the first deadline of the 25/30 Rules, various
parties related to the taxicab industry filed suit in federal court
seeking an injunction. 30 On October 31, 2008, the District Court
standards for taxicabs regarding safety, design, comfort, convenience, noise and
air pollution, as well as efficiency. See id.
23. See Metro. Taxicab, 2008 WL 4866021, at *3 (explaining how hybrids did
not meet TLC's previous interior room requirements for taxicabs).

24. See id. (discussing origin of New York City's first attempt to make its taxicab fleet completely hybrid). Among the many goals of "PlaNYC 2030," New York
City hopes to reduce its global warming emissions by thirty percent and achieve
the cleanest air of any major U.S. city by 2030. See NYC.gov, PlaNYC Background,
http://www.nyc.gov/html/planyc203O/html/challenge/challenge.shtml (last visited Feb. 28, 2010) (stating objectives of New York City's ambitious environmental
initiatives).
25. See Sewell Chan, Judge Blocks Hybrid Taxi Requirement, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 31,
2008, http://cityroom.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/10/31/judge-blocks-hybrid-taxirequirement/#more-4613 (providing makeup of New York City's taxicab fleet).
For a definition of "fuel economy," see infra note 62.
26. See Metro. Taxicab Opinion, 2008 WL 4866021, at *2 (revealing origin and
adoption of TLC's 25/30 Rules).
27. See id. (explicating provisions of 25/30 Rules).
28. See id. at *2 (clarifying impact of minimum mileage requirements).
29. See id. (illustrating eventual implications of 25/30 Rules).
30. See id. at *1 (providing full list of parties involved in lawsuit). The plaintiffs included: Metropolitan Taxicab Board of Trade, a trade association made up
of yellow medallion taxi fleets in New York City; Midtown Operating Corp., a private yellow taxicab garage that leases taxis to hundreds of independent contrac-

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2010

5

Villanova Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 21, Iss. 2 [2010], Art. 4

330

VILLANOVA ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JouRNAL

[Vol. XXI: p. 325

for the Southern District of New York granted the plaintiffs' motion
for a preliminary injunction in part because the plaintiffs would be
irreparably harmed if forced to comply with the new rules. 31 The
court further held that the plaintiffs had demonstrated they were
likely to succeed in showing that these rules were preempted by the
federal Energy Policy and Conservation Act (EPCA).32 Notably, the

court rejected the plaintiffs' argument that the TLC regulations
were also preempted by the federal Clean Air Act (CAA).33
Disappointed by this roadblock in his administration's attempt
to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, Mayor Bloomberg lashed out
against the "archaic Washington regulations" behind the ruling for
preventing cities "from choosing to create cleaner air and a healthier place to live. '' 34 The mayor elaborated, "The sad irony here is
that the laws being relied on by the plaintiff [s] ... were designed to
reduce air pollution and reduce our dependence on foreign oil,
which is exactly what moving to fuel efficient cabs will do."3 5 Determined to find a detour to achieving a cleaner taxicab fleet, Mayor
Bloomberg instructed the TLC to develop a program of financial
incentives and disincentives to promote the use of fuel-efficient
36
vehicles.
On March 26, 2009, the TLC repealed the 25/30 Rules and
enacted new regulations (Lease Cap Rules) that altered the maximum lease rate vehicle owners could charge drivers for leasing taxicabs in twelve-hour shifts.3 7 First, these regulations reduced the
tors; Sweet Irene Transportation Co., Inc., a private corporate that owns and leases
taxis; Ossman Ali, a self-employed independent contractor who buys, leases, and
drives taxis; and Kevin Healy, a frequent taxi passenger. See id. The defendants
included: the City of New York; the TLC; Mayor Michael Bloomberg, in his official
capacity; Matthew Daus, in his capacity as Commissioner, Chair, and Chief Executive Officer of the TLC; Peter Schenkman, in his capacity as the Assistant Commissioner for Safety and Emissions of the TLC; and Andrew Salkin, in his capacity as
TLC First Deputy Commissioner. See id.
31. See Metro. Taxicab, 2008 WL 4866021, at *15 (granting plaintiffs' motion

for preliminary injunction against 25/30 Rules).
32. See id. (holding that EPCA preempts 25/30 Rules). For a further discussion of the EPCA, see infra notes 62-67 and accompanying text.
33. See id. at *14 (finding that CAA does not preempt 25/30 Rules). For a

further discussion of the CAA, see infra notes 68-72 and accompanying text.
34. Chan, supra note 25 (quoting Mayor Bloomberg's response to decision
striking down 25/30 Rules).
35. Id. (elaborating on Mayor Bloomberg's qualms with district court's
decision).

36. See id. (observing Mayor Bloomberg's resolve to turn taxicab fleet completely hybrid through different approach than 25/30 Rules).
37. See Metro. Taxicab Bd. of Trade v. City of New York, 633 F. Supp. 2d 83, 88-89

(S.D.N.Y. 2009) (noting origins of Lease Cap Rules). Prior to the new TLC regulations, the maximum lease rates were "$105 for all day shifts; $115 for the night shift
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maximum lease rate, otherwise known as the lease cap, for all taxicabs that were not hybrids, clean diesel, or wheelchair accessible 38
An initial reduction of $4 per shift was scheduled to go into effect
on May 1, 2009, with the reduction increasing to $8 per shift on
May 1, 2010, and $12 per shift on May 1, 2011.39 Second, the regu-

lations raised the lease cap by $3 per shift for vehicles meeting certain specifications. 40 Although the Lease Cap Rules did not
expressly mandate the purchase of hybrids, the only vehicles that
met the specifications warranting an increase were the same hybrids
4
that satisfied the abandoned 25/30 Rules. '
According to the city, the Lease Cap Rules corrected a structural disincentive preventing many taxicab owners from switching
their fleets to hybrid vehicles. 42 Under the existing framework of
regulations and industry custom, taxicab drivers, rather than vehicle owners, paid for gasoline. 43 With fuel costs therefore irrelevant
to owners, and the cost of transforming a hybrid into a taxicab
higher than transforming a conventional vehicle, most owners re44
sorted to purchasing the cheaper, time-tested Crown Victoria.
Hence, the goal of the Lease Cap Rules was to shift the cost of gasoline, which is higher for conventional vehicles, from drivers to owners by reducing the lease income of those who owned nonhybrid
45
taxicabs.
Mayor Bloomberg was not ambiguous about his intentions with
the new TLC regulations: "By offering incentives that will encourage more taxi fleet owners to purchase hybrids, we have found
another avenue to reach our goal of greening our yellow cabs, im-

on Sunday, Monday, and Tuesday; $120 for the night shift on Wednesday; and
$129 for the night shifts on Thursday, Friday, and Saturday." Id. at 89.
38. See id. at 89 (illuminating details of Lease Cap Rules).
39. See id. (describing financial disincentives within Lease Cap Rules).
40. See id. (detailing financial incentive within Lease Cap Rules).
41. See id. (exposing underlying goal of new financial incentive).
42. See Metro. Taxicab, 633 F. Supp. 2d at 90 (sharing New York City's justification for Lease Cap Rules).

43. See id. (examining existing financial arrangement between taxicab owners
and taxicab drivers).
44. See id. (highlighting result of system in which taxicab drivers pay fuel costs

rather than taxicab owners).
45. See id. (explaining cost-shifting purpose of Lease Cap Rules). The TLC

calculated the amount of its financial incentives and disincentives by comparing
the approximate costs of gasoline, the approximate costs of purchasing and converting a hybrid into a taxicab, the maximum number of shifts per year, and the
average fuel economy of a Crown Victoria with the same attributes of a Ford Escape, the most popular brand of hybrid taxicab. See id. at 90-91.
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proving our air quality, and reducing our carbon emissions." 46 As
the TLC Commissioner elaborated, the Lease Cap Rules were expected to "incentivize the purchase of cleaner vehicles, while ensuring that taxi drivers are not penalized because a taxicab owner is
reluctant to make the wiser purchase of a hybrid vehicle." 4 7 Once
again, however, members of the taxi industry challenged the TLC
48
regulations shortly before the revised first deadline.
On April 17, 2009, the trade association that had opposed the
25/30 Rules, as well as various taxicab fleet owners, filed an
amended complaint. 49 The plaintiffs alleged that the Lease Cap
Rules, much like the 25/30 Rules, were preempted by the EPCA
and CAA because they were "essentially a mandate to purchase vehicles with a certain mpg or emissions rating."50 After the plaintiffs
moved for a preliminary injunction, an evidentiary hearing was
held on May 20, 2009, to determine the effect of the Lease Cap
Rules on the plaintiffs and whether the rules indeed forced the
plaintiffs to purchase hybrids. 5 1 Granting the plaintiffs' motion on
June 22, 2009, the district court held that the plaintiffs had demonstrated irreparable harm and a likelihood of success in showing that
both the EPCA and CAA preempted the defacto mandate imposed
52
by the TLC's new regulations.

46. Press Release, Office of the Mayor, Bloomberg Announces New Incentive/Disincentive Program to Reach Goal of Green Taxi Fleet (Nov. 14, 2008),

http://www.nyc.gov/ (search for "Bloomberg Announces New Incentive/Disincentive Program to Reach Goal of Green Taxi Fleet" and follow "Press Release Mayor Michael R. Bloomberg" hyperlink in search results) (announcing aim of

Lease Cap Rules).
47. Id. (declaring anticipated consequences of Lease Cap Rules).
48. See Metro. Taxicab, 633 F. Supp. 2d at 91 (discussing initiation of most re-

cent legal action).
49. See id. (describing plaintiffs' suit to prevent enforcement of Lease Cap
Rules). The plaintiffs specifically consisted of Metropolitan Taxicab Board of

Trade, Midtown Car Leasing Corp., Bath Cab Corp., Ronart Leasing Corp., Geid
Cab Corp., Linden Maintenance Corp., and Ann Taxi Inc. See id. at 83. Together,
the plaintiffs controlled one-quarter of all taxicabs in New York City. See id. at 91.
For a list of the defendants, which were identical in the initial complaint, see supra

note 30.
50. Metro. Taxicab, 633 F. Supp. 2d at 91 (offering plaintiffs' claims in support

of injunction against Lease Cap Rules).
51. See id. (relating procedural posture of case).
52. See id. at 105-06 (granting preliminary injunction and holding Lease Cap

Rules preempted by EPCA and CAA).
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III.

333

BACKGROUND

The U.S. federal government has not always been at the forefront of protecting the environment. 53 With the government unwilling to inhibit technological or economic progress for the better
part of the nation's history, the only possible redress for environmental transgressions came from common law actions. 54 Beginning with President Theodore Roosevelt, the federal government
began taking on greater regulatory powers throughout the twentieth century. 5 5 Nevertheless, unbridled growth of various industries
by the 1950s created highly visible forms of pollution and rendered
the traditional method of addressing environmental grievances
56
inadequate.
Ultimately, the federal government responded to growing concern about the environment by creating the EPA in 1970. 5 7 Con-

gress passed the CAA that same year, directing the EPA to set
national air standards. 58 Following the 1973-1974 Arab oil embargo
and resulting energy crisis in the U.S., Congress passed the EPCA in
1975. 59 The EPCA's primary legislative goals were energy conservation and efficiency, but in practice these efforts offered additional
environmental protections. 60 While the CAA and EPCA grant different powers to the federal government, their regulation of vehi-

53. See Jack Lewis, Looking Backward: A Historical Perspective on Environmental
Regulations, EPAJouRNAL, Mar. 1988, available at http://www.epa.gov/history/topics/regulate/O1.htm (narrating historical background on U.S. environmental
regulations).
54. See id. (noting initial difficulty of redressing environmental grievances).
55. See id. (illustrating growth of U.S. regulatory framework).
56. See id. (describing impact of booming chemical, plastics, petroleum, automotive, aviation, and munitions industries). The problem was not so much the
number of environmental actions at common law, but rather the difficulty in deciding them. Id. Expert witnesses would often argue for both sides of any case "to
the consternation and confusion of judges and juries," and many cases involved
multistate metropolitan areas "with a crazy quilt of conflicting state laws and local
ordinances." Id.
57. See id. (explaining origins of Environmental Protection Agency).
58. See William D. Ruckelshaus, Environmental Regulation: The Early Days at
EPA, EPA JouRNAL, Mar. 1988, available at http://www.epa.gov/history/topics/
regulate/02.htm (recounting issues underlying passage of Clean Air Act).
59. See Nat'l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., CAFE Overview, http://nhtsa.
4
(follow
gov/portal/site/nhtsa/menuitem.43ac99aefa80569eea57529cdba0 6a0/
"CAFE Overview" hyperlink under "Frequently Asked Questions" heading) (last
visited Feb. 28, 2010) [hereinafter CAFE Overview] (relating origin of Energy Policy and Conservation Act).
60. See generally S. REP. No. 94-516 (1975) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1975
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1956 (offering objectives of Energy Policy and Conservation Act).
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cles is closely related, and both laws play a significant role in the
ongoing debate surrounding preemption. 6 1
A. Energy Policy and Conservation Act
The EPCA charges the federal Department of Transportation
(DOT) with establishing the maximum feasible average fuel econ62
omy for U.S. automobile manufacturers in a given model year.
This duty is carried out within the DOT by the National Highway
Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), which sets fuel economy
standards for passenger cars and light trucks using various factors
supplied by statute. 63 Accordingly, NHTSA's Corporate Average
Fuel Economy (CAFE) framework allows manufacturers to sell any
combination of vehicles provided that the average fuel economy of
64
their nationwide fleets meets the applicable mileage standard.
CAFE currently requires a fleet average of 27.5 mpg, but Congress
recently increased this standard to thirty-five mpg beginning with
model year 2020.65
An express preemption clause within the EPCA declares:
61. For a further discussion of these statutes and how their objectives are intrinsically linked, see infra notes 62-72, 96-104 and accompanying text.
62. See 49 U.S.C. § 32902(a) (2006) (establishing how fuel economy standards
are prescribed). "Fuel economy is defined as the average mileage traveled by an
automobile per gallon of gasoline ... consumed as measured in accordance with
the testing and evaluation protocol set forth by the [EPA]." CAFE Overview, supra
note 59. Basically, the EPA measures exhaust emissions of hydrocarbons, carbon
monoxide, and carbon dioxide per mile traveled and uses a formula known as the
carbon balance equation to calculate the amount of fuel burned per mile driven.
See Raymond B. Ludwiszewski & Charles H. Haake, Cars, Carbon, and Climate
Change, 102 Nw. U. L. REv. 665, 687 (2008) (explaining how vehicle fuel economy
is measured).
63. See 49 U.S.C. § 32902(f) (2006) (listing considerations for determining
maximum feasible average fuel economy). The factors that must be considered
are technological feasibility, economic practicability, the effect of other federal
motor vehicle standards on fuel economy, and the country's need to conserve energy. See id. NHTSA has interpreted economic practicability "to include consideration of consumer choice, economic hardship for the automobile industry, and
vehicle safety." Green Mountain Chrysler Plymouth DodgeJeep v. Crombie, 508 F. Supp.
2d 295, 307 (D. Vt. 2007) (explicating process undertaken by NHTSA to set fuel
economy standards). Light trucks with a gross vehicle weight rating exceeding
8,500 pounds-such as certain pickup trucks, sport utility vehicles, and large
vans-do not have to comply with CAFE standards through model year 2010. See
CAFE Overview, supra note 59 (differentiating types of vehicles subject to CAFE
standards).
64. See Ludwiszewski & Haake, supra note 62, at 682 (explaining CAFE
system).
65. See 49 U.S.C. § 32902(b) (2006) (providing automobile fuel economy average for model years 2011 through 2020); Energy Independence and Security Act
of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-140, § 102, 121 Stat. 1492, 1499 (increasing average fuel
economy beginning with model year 2020).
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When an average fuel economy standard prescribed under
this chapter is in effect, a State or a political subdivision of
a State may not adopt or enforce a law or regulation related to fuel economy standards or average fuel economy
standards for automobiles covered by an average fuel
66
economy standard under this chapter.
A savings clause exists, however, which permits a state or political subdivision to "prescribe requirements for fuel economy for au67
tomobiles obtained for its own use."
B.

Clean Air Act

Part of the EPA's mandate under the CAA is to establish emissions standards for new motor vehicles. 6 A preemption clause associated with this responsibility provides, in relevant part, that "[n]o
State or any political subdivision thereof shall adopt or attempt to
enforce any standard relating to the control of emissions from new
69
motor vehicles or new motor vehicle engines subject to this part."
The same section of the CAA also contains two exceptions to this
express preemption clause. 70 First, California is permitted to receive a waiver from the EPA Administrator if it meets certain qualifications, and can thereby set its own emissions standards. 7 1 Second,
other states may adopt California's standards that receive a waiver
72
from the EPA.
66. 49 U.S.C. § 32919(a) (2006) (promulgating EPCA express preemption
provision).
67. 49 U.S.C. § 32919(c) (2006) (providing exception to EPCA express preemption clause).
68. See 42 U.S.C. § 7521 (a) (2006) (delegating authority to regulate vehicle
emissions to EPA Administrator). The EPA dictates how much pollution new motor vehicles may emit, but automakers get to decide how to abide by this limitation.
See AUTOMOBILE EMISSIONS, supra note 5, at 3 (discussing EPA emissions standards).
69. 42 U.S.C. § 7543(a) (2006) (promulgating CAA express preemption
provision).
70. See 42 U.S.C. § 7543(b) (2006) (offering exceptions to CAA express preemption clause).
71. See 42 U.S.C. § 7543(b)(1) (2006) (providing grounds for waiver of preemption). While the statute specifically allows the EPA Administrator to grant a
waiver to any state which adopted emission standards for new vehicles prior to
March 30, 1966, California is the only state that meets this description. See Cent.
Valley Chrysler-Jeep, Inc. v. Goldstene, 529 F. Supp. 2d 1151, 1156 (E.D. Cal. 2008).
72. See 42 U.S.C. § 7543(b) (3) (2006) (extending possibility of waiver to every
state). If California's standards are granted a waiver of preemption, compliance
with them is treated as compliance with federal standards. Id. At least eleven
states have adopted California's emissions standards since 1994. See Ludwiszewski
& Haake, supra note 62, at 675 (discussing California's special status under CAA).
On March 6, 2008, the EPA generated some controversy by initially denying a
waiver to California's restrictions on greenhouse gas emissions from new automo-
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Doctrine of Preemption

The doctrine of preemption is grounded in the Supremacy
Clause of the U.S. Constitution, which asserts that the Constitution
and U.S. laws "shall be the supreme Law of the Land," notwithstanding any contrary state laws or constitutions. 73 Various types of
preemption exist, including express preemption and implied preemption.7 4 Additionally, implied preemption may be divided into
so-called field preemption and conflict preemption. 75 State and local laws may therefore be preempted by "express language in a congressional enactment, by implication from the depth and breadth
of a congressional scheme that occupies the legislative field, or by
implication because of a conflict with a congressional enactment. '76
Congressional intent is the touchstone in every preemption
analysis for determining the scope of a statute with alleged preemptive power. 77 Even where Congress has spoken expressly about preemption, a well-established presumption against preemption is
recognized when Congress legislates in a field traditionally occupied by the states. 78 Thus, courts start with the assumption that federal law does not supersede the historic police powers of states
79
unless that is the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.

biles. See U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, California Greenhouse Gas Waiver Request,
http://www.epa.gov/OMS/climate/ca-waiver.htm (last visited Feb. 28, 2010) (re-

lating California's waiver process). With a new Administration in the White
House, however, the EPA ultimately reconsidered its decision and granted a waiver
of preemption on June 30, 2009. Id. California accordingly leads the nation in

vehicle fuel economy and the number of registered alternative-fuel vehicles. See
Michael Grunwald, Why California is Still America's Future, TIME, Oct. 23, 2009,

http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1931582,00.html
(explaining
how California is at forefront of national energy debate as greenest state in
America).
73. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (rendering state and local laws subordinate to
federal law).
74. See Opinion & Order, Metro. Taxicab Bd. of Trade v. City of New York, No. 08
Civ. 7837 (PAC), 2008 WL 4866021, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 31, 2008) (distinguishing

types of preemption).
75. See id. (characterizing forms of implied preemption).
76. Id. (quoting Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 541 (2001)) (ex-

plaining multiple ways preemption may apply to state and local laws).
77. See Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1194 (2009) (citing Medtronic, Inc. v.
Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996)) (establishing framework for preemption analysis).
78. See id. at 1194-95 (citing Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996))
(describing traditional presumption against preemption).
79. See id. (citing Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996)) (defining
presumption against preemption).
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Environmental Federalism

Although the Supreme Court's preemption jurisprudence is
often inconsistent and difficult to apply, various cases are relevant
to the preemption provisions within the EPCA and CAA. 80 In Engine ManufacturersAss'n v. South Coast Air Quality Management District
(Engine Manufacturers),81 the Court invoked CAA preemption
against rules enacted by a political subdivision of California that
prohibited the purchase or leasing of vehicles which failed to meet
certain emissions requirements.8 2 The Court found that a state law
need not actually interfere with federal law to be considered "related to" the latter for the purposes of preemption. 3 Even though
the challenged rules had a limited impact on the objectives of the
CAA, the Court also noted that allowing one state or political subdivision to enact such rules would lead to an aggregate effect that
eventually "would undo Congress's carefully calibrated regulatory
84
scheme."
In multiple decisions unrelated to environmental regulation,
the Supreme Court has broadly interpreted the statutory meaning
of the phrase related to. 85 Derivations of this phrase are important
because the preemption provisions of the EPCA and CAA apply respectively to regulations "related to fuel economy standards" and
"relating to the control of emissions." 86 In Travelers Indemnity Co. v.
Bailey (Bailey),87 for example, the Court expressed that the phrase
"in relation to" is expansive when used in a statute. 88 The Court
80. See Alexandra B. Klass, State Innovation And Preemption: Lessons From State
Climate Change Efforts, 41 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 1653, 1658 (2008) (criticizing Supreme
Court precedents involving preemption).
81. 541 U.S. 246 (2004).
82. Id. at 258-59 (invoking CAA preemption against rules established by entity
responsible for air pollution control in Los Angeles metropolitan area). The
Court held that the challenged rules set "standards" within the meaning of the
CAA express preemption clause even though the rules regulated the purchase of
new vehicles rather than vehicle sales. Id. at 253-55.
83. See id. at 255 (clarifying meaning of "related to" in any preemption

clause).
84. Id. (offering rationale for applying CAA preemption).
85. See, e.g., Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 237 (1993) (portraying phrase
"in relation to" as expansive); New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield
Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 653 (1995) (construing phrase "relate to" as
having a connection with or making reference to).
86. See 49 U.S.C. § 32919(a) (2006) (promulgating EPCA express preemption
provision); 42 U.S.C. § 7543(a) (2006) (promulgating CAA express preemption
provision).
87. 129 S. Ct. 2195 (2009).
88. See id. at 2203 (reiterating observation on phrase "in relation to" from
Smith).
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further demonstrated in New York State Conference of Blue Cross &
Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Insurance Co.8 9 that understanding related to requires comparing the objectives of the supposedly preemptive federal statute with the purpose and effects of the
challenged state or local law.9 0
There are no precedents in which fuel economy standards
were directly challenged on the basis of EPCA and CAA preemption, but two 2007 cases discuss this issue incidentally: Green Mountain Chrysler Plymouth Dodge Jeep v. Crombie (Crombie)9 1 and Central
Valley Chysler-Jeep, Inc. v. Goldstene (Goldstene)92 In these cases, automobile manufacturers filed essentially identical lawsuits challenging
California's stringent emissions standards for new vehicles. 9 3 Both
federal district courts held that these standards would be valid if
and when the EPA granted a waiver of preemption under the
CAA. 9 4 Regarding the applicability of a presumption against preemption, the court in Crombie determined that the regulation of vehicle emissions cannot be categorized as either a traditional area of
state regulation or an area in which federal control is
95
predominate.
Another notable conclusion in these cases was the lack of inherent conflict between the EPA's authority under the CAA and

89. 514 U.S. 645 (1995).
90. See id. at 656-59 (exhibiting process for interpreting "related to" language

in preemption clause).
91. 508 F. Supp. 2d 295 (D. Vt. 2007).
92. 529 F. Supp. 2d 1151 (E.D. Cal. 2007).
93. See Green Mountain ChryslerPlymouth DodgeJeep v. Crombie, 508 F. Supp. 2d
295, 300-01 (D. Vt. 2007) (discussing initiation of case); Cent. Valley Chrysler-Jeep,
Inc. v. Goldstene 529 F. Supp. 2d 1151, 1154-55 (E.D. Cal. 2007) (providing procedural history). Vermont adopted California's regulations in anticipation of the

latter receiving a waiver of CAA preemption. See 42 U.S.C. § 7543(b) (3) (2006)
(extending possibility of waiver to states complying with California's standards previously granted a waiver).
94. See Crombie, 508 F. Supp. 2d at 397 (expressing that CAA preemption is
not applicable if EPA grants waiver to California's emissions standards); Goldstene,
529 F. Supp. 2d at 1189 (concluding that California regulations become immune
from preemption once granted waiver of preemption). The decisions in these

twin cases take on new meaning considering that the EPA recently granted the
waiver sought by California. For a discussion of the controversy involving this
waiver application, see supra note 72.
95. See Crombie, 508 F. Supp. 2d at 350-51 (comparing regulation of vehicle
emissions to other regulatory areas in which state or federal control clearly dominates). Since the beginning of federal involvement inthis area, the regulation of
environmental pollution has been regarded as a cooperative legislative effort, characterized by overlapping spheres of state and federal authority. See id.
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NHTSA's authority under the EPCA. 96 While the CAA does not
mention vehicle fuel economy, emissions standards essentially
double as mileage standards because the only way to reduce a vehicle's carbon emissions is to improve its fuel economy.97 When state
or local regulations specifically target vehicle emissions-by mandating the sale of "zero-emission vehicles," for example-courts
have had no difficulty finding such regulations preempted by the
CAA. 9 8 The preemption analysis becomes more complicated when
regulations target vehicle mileage standards but remain silent on
emissions. 99
The court in Crombie also found that Congress's undoubted intent with the EPCA's express preemption clause "was to make the
setting of fuel economy standards exclusively a federal concern
.... "100 Yet, Crombie and Goldstene both demonstrate that regulations preempted by the EPCA are not necessarily preempted by the
CAA. 10 1 Despite the scientific overlap between these two types of
regulations, certain courts will not find mileage standards preempted by the CAA unless one of their stated objectives is address96. See id. at 350 (concluding that preemption doctrines do not apply to interplay between CAA and EPCA); Goldstene 529 F. Supp. 2d at 1169-70 (observing that
conflict is possible but not inevitable between purposes of CAA and EPCA).
97. See Ludwiszewski & Haake, supra note 62, at 667 (explaining how carbon
dioxide emissions are direct function of burning fossil fuels). "Improving fuel
economy so that vehicles burn less gasoline is the only known practical way for a
manufacturer of today's gasoline-powered automobiles to reduce tailpipe emissions of CO 2." Id. at 687. See supra note 62 for an explanation of how fuel economy is measured, which underscores the link between fuel economy and vehicle
emissions.
98. See, e.g., Ass'n of Int'l Auto. Mfrs., Inc. v. Comm'r, Mass. Dept. of Envtl. Prot.,
208 F.3d 1, 6-7 (1st Cir. 2000) (finding zero-emission vehicle mandates are standards relating to control of emissions within meaning of CAA preemption clause);
Am. Auto. Mfrs. Ass'n v. Cahill, 152 F.3d 196, 199-200 (2d Cir. 1998) (holding requirement that zero-emission vehicles comprise certain percentage of new lightduty-vehicles to be preempted by CAA). Even though the challenged regulations
in Cahill did not impose a precise limit on emissions, the Second Circuit expressed
that there were sufficient grounds for preemption because the requirement had
.no purpose other than to effect a general reduction in emissions" and was "in the
nature of a command having a direct effect on the level of emissions." Cahill, 152
F.3d at 200.
99. See, e.g.,
Opinion & Order, Metro. Taxicab Bd. of Trade v. City of New York,
No. 08 Civ. 7837 (PAC), 2008 WL 4866021, at *14 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 31, 2008) (finding CAA preemption unlikely based on purpose of rules despite their potential
effect).
100. Crombie, 508 F. Supp. 2d at 354 (describing Congressional intent behind
EPCA preemption clause).
101. See id. at 353 (asserting that emissions regulations are not equivalent to
fuel economy standards when compliance is not achieved solely through improving fuel efficiency); Goldstene, 529 F. Supp. 2d at 1176 (rejecting notion that emissions regulation requiring substantial improvement in mileage standards
constitutes defacto regulation of fuel economy without one-to-one correlation).
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ing vehicle emissions. 10 2 As the Supreme Court concluded in
Massachusetts v. EnvironmentalProtection Agency, 10 3 a landmark decision solidifying the authority of the EPA to regulate greenhouse
gases, inconsistency between the EPA's obligations under the 10CAA
4
and the DOT's obligations under the EPCA is not inevitable.
IV.

NARRATIVE ANALYSIS

In Metropolitan Taxicab, the District Court for the Southern District of New York found the TLC's Lease Cap Rules to be a de facto
mandate on taxicab owners to purchase hybrids and held that this
mandate is preempted by the EPCA and CAA because it relates to
both fuel economy and emissions standards.1 0 5 Before embarking
on its analysis, the court acknowledged that no one questions the
desirability of fuel-efficient vehicles or the ability of New York City
to incentivize the purchase of certain types of taxicabs.1 0 6 Instead,
the narrow issue in this case was whether the TLC's regulations interfered with Congressional intent to preserve exclusive jurisdiction
10 7
over the regulation of fuel economy and vehicle emissions.
A. De Facto Mandate Determination
To resolve this question, the court first sought to determine if
the Lease Cap Rules mandated the purchase of hybrid taxicabs. 10 8
102. See, e.g., Opinion & Order, Metro. Taxicab Opinion, 2008 WL 4866021, at
*14 (finding CAA preemption not applicable to rules that are silent on emissions

even if emissions reduction is likely result).
103. 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
104. See id. at 532 (discussing relationship between responsibilities of EPA and
DOT). A certain amount of consistency can actually be expected given the similarity in the factors that the EPA and NHTSA must consider when setting their respective standards. See Goldstene, 529 F. Supp. 2d at 1169.
105. See Metro. Taxicab Bd. of Trade v. City of New York, 633 F. Supp. 2d 83, 10506 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (granting preliminary injunction against Lease Cap Rules).
This holding marked a slight retreat from the court's prior decision regarding the
TLC's 25/30 Rules, which were deemed to be preempted by the EPCA but not the
CAA. See Metro. Taxicab, 2008 WL 4866021, at *14-15.
106. See Metro. Taxicab, 633 F. Supp. 2d at 87 (clarifying parameters of case).
There were no legal challenges to incentives such as the city issuing new taxicab
medallions exclusively for hybrid vehicles, extending the life of hybrid taxicabs
from three to five years, or increasing the maximum lease rate for hybrid taxicabs
by $3 per shift. See id. Furthermore, the court expressed that "[i]ncreasing the
number of hybrid taxicabs is an appropriate and important government priority."
Id.
107. See id. (elucidating case's narrow issue). Because the plaintiffs moved for
a preliminary injunction against the Lease Cap Rules, the court could grant this
motion only upon a showing of irreparable harm and demonstration of a likelihood of success on the merits. See id. at 92.
108. See id. at 87 (describing first step in court's preemption analysis).
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Due to the lack of controlling cases, the parties drew comparisons
to preemption cases involving the federal Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA).109 From these cases, the court

concluded that
a local law is preempted if it directly regulates within a
field preempted by Congress, or if it indirectly regulates
within a preempted field in such a way that effectively
mandates a specific, preempted outcome ....

Conversely,

a local law is not preempted when it only indirectly regulates parties within a preempted field and presents regulated parties with viable, non-preempted options. 110
Although the ERISA cases provided a framework for analyzing
the interplay between a de facto mandate and preemption, they
failed to reveal how to determine whether particular economic incentives established a mandate. 1 ' Hence, the court asked the parties to present expert evidence on the consequences of the Lease
1 12
Cap Rules.
Ultimately, the plaintiffs' evidence convinced the court that
the profit disparity between owning a Crown Victoria taxicab and
owning a hybrid taxicab would become so great that no rational
owner would choose the former. 113 The court concluded that the
Lease Cap Rules presented an offer which realistically could not be
refused, thereby rejecting the defendants' argument that the rules
were not a mandate as long as owners of conventional taxicabs continued to earn any profit. 114 This conclusion was bolstered by the
109. See id. at 93 (relating how parties resorted to ERISA preemption cases
due to lack of cases on point).
110. Id. at 95-96 (synthesizing rule from various ERISA cases with differing

outcomes). The cases relied on by the court were New York State Conference of Blue
Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645 (1995); CaliforniaDiv. of
Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham Constr., 519 U.S. 316 (1997); Retail Indus.
Leaders Ass'n v. Fielder, 475 F.3d 180 (4th Cir. 2007); and Retail Indus. Leaders Ass'n
v. Suffolk County, 497 F. Supp. 2d 403 (E.D.N.Y. 2007).
111. See Metro. Taxicab, 633 F. Supp. 2d at 96 (explaining that ERISA cases
alone are insufficient to make determination about Lease Cap Rules).
112. See id. (suggesting need for particular evidence to complete preemption
analysis).
113. See id. at 97 (discussing evidence presented by both parties regarding
impact of Lease Cap Rules). The plaintiffs' expert economist estimated that, by
2011, annual profits from owning a Crown Victoria taxicab would be reduced to
$581 while profits from owning a hybrid taxicab would reach $7,099. See id. at 96.
114. See id. at 97-99 (rebuffing claims by defendants' expert in favor of those
made by plaintiffs' expert). The taxicab industry is profit-oriented, according to
the court, and therefore fleet owners will always take a larger profit over a smaller
one. See id. at 100.
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fact that the Lease Cap Rules were expressly adopted to encourage
the purchase of hybrids. 1 5 Consequently, the court held that the
TLC's rules effectively mandated the purchase of hybrids by providl 6
ing no viable alternatives to taxicab owners."
B.

EPCA Preemption

Once the court deemed the Lease Cap Rules a mandate, it
turned its attention to whether they were related to fuel economy
or emissions standards so as to be preempted by the EPCA or
CAA. 1 7 The defendants tried to distinguish the Lease Cap Rules
from the TLC's previous 25/30 Rules, which they admitted were
preempted under the EPCA, by arguing that the new rules simply
required hybrid taxicabs without requiring vehicles of a certain
mpg rating.1 1 8 The court rejected this narrow construction of related to, however, in light of the U.S. Supreme Court's broad interpretation of that phrase in Bailey.119 Regardless of whether the
Lease Cap Rules mentioned specific mileage standards, the district
court explained, they effectively forced taxicab owners to meet a
certain mpg threshold set by the fuel economy of TLC-approved
120
hybrid or clean diesel vehicles.
In addition to the effect of the Lease Cap Rules, the court
looked to the purpose of the regulation to determine if preemption
was justified. 12 Based on the statements of New York City officials,
it was clear that the rules were intended to address fuel efficiency. 12 2 The court asserted that "creative drafting and the absence of specific reference to mileage do not make the effect-or
the purpose-of the Lease Cap Rules any different than the prior
115. See id. at 96 (noting justification for implementing rules). For statements

made by New York City officials that reveal the objectives of the Lease Cap Rules,
see supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text.
116. See Metro. Taxicab, 633 F. Supp. 2d at 100 (holding Lease Cap Rules to be
defacto mandate to purchase hybrids).
117. See id. at 87 (discussing next step in preemption analysis).
118. See id. at 101-02 (reiterating arguments made by New York City in favor

of Lease Cap Rules).
119. See id. at 102 (rejecting defendants' proposed interpretation of "related
to").
120. See id. (emphasizing practical consequences of Lease Cap Rules).
121. See Metro. Taxicab, 633 F. Supp. 2d at 102 (bolstering conclusion about

effect of rules with their ostensible purpose).
122. See id. at 102-03 (drawing inference from statements made by proponents

of Lease Cap Rules). In announcing the Lease Cap Rules, for example, the TLC
Commissioner stated, "Our goal from the beginning was to get fuel efficient taxis on
the road using whatever appropriate methods required.. . ." Id.

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj/vol21/iss2/4

18

Liebeskind: It's Not Easy Green: Metropolitan Taxicab Reveals Hurdles Posed b

2010]

CASENOTE

343

'
preempted [25/30 Rules]. "123
Sidestepping the question of how
the EPCA holds up in light of a presumption against preemption,
the court simply noted that the express language of the EPCA's preemption clause and recent conduct by the federal government led
to the sole conclusion that fuel economy standards are a federal
matter. 124 Thus, the EPCA preempted the Lease Cap Rules because
they related to fuel economy standards in violation of the federal
1 25
government's exclusive jurisdiction.

C.

CAA Preemption

Turning to the CAA, the court set out to determine if the
26
Lease Cap Rules also related to the control of vehicle emissions.'
First, the court reexamined the purpose of these rules and distinguished them from the TLC's abandoned 25/30 Rules. 12 7 Unlike
the 25/30 Rules, which the court previously held did not relate to
emissions standards because they were silent on emissions, one of
the stated purposes of the Lease Cap Rules was to incentivize the
purchase of "cleaner vehicles."1 28 Relying on the Supreme Court's
interpretation of "alternative-fuel vehicles" in Engine Manufacturers
and the definition of "hybrid vehicle" within the Lease Cap Rules,
the district court remarked that it is a matter of common sense that
29
cleaner vehicles refers to the control of emissions.'
In terms of the emissions-related effect of the Lease Cap Rules,
the court observed that their impact on nationwide regulation and
123. Id. at 103 (criticizing New York City's attempt to pass off preempted rules
under misleading guise).
124. See id. (asserting exclusive federal jurisdiction over fuel economy standards). The court pointed to a May 2009 proposal by President Barack Obama,
which suggested that new CAFE standards require a fleet average of 35.5 mpg by
2016, to demonstrate that the federal government is actively involved in the regulation of fuel economy. See id. at 101.
125. See id. at 103 (finding Lease Cap Rules preempted by EPCA).
126. See Metro. Taxicab, 633 F. Supp. 2d at 103 (repeating preemption analysis
with CAA).
127. See id. at 104 (comparing Lease Cap Rules to 25/30 Rules).
128. See id. (highlighting differences in language of old rules and new rules).
129. See id. at 104-05 (surmising true meaning of plain language in Lease Cap
Rules). The court explained how it was assumed in Engine Manufactures that regulations requiring "alternative-fuel vehicles" related to the control of emissions simply because the term was defined as vehicles not powered by gasoline or diesel. See

id. at 105. Under the Lease Cap Rules, a "hybrid vehicle" was defined as a "commercially available mass production vehicle originally equipped by the manufacturers with a combustion engine system together with an electric propulsion system
that operates in an integrated manner." Id. The court deemed these definitions
sufficiently similar not to require expert testimony to demonstrate the close con-

nection between hybrids and vehicle emissions. See id.
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vehicle production would be minimal. 130 Nevertheless, in light of
the rationale for preemption promulgated by Engine Manufacturers,
the court could not allow such minor intrusions to stand because of
the harmful snowball effect they could create. 131 Much like how
the Lease Cap Rules were related to fuel economy despite their failure to impose a specific mpg requirement, the court found the
rules to also be related to vehicle emissions despite the absence of a
precise limit on emissions.1 32 Regardless of the rules' overt language, it was sufficient in the eyes of the court that the rules at3
tempted to have a general effect of reducing taxicab emissions. 13
Thus, the CAA also preempted the Lease Cap Rules because their
purpose and effect related to the control of vehicle emissions. 3 4
V.

CRITICAL ANALYSIS

A. Alternative Routes to Environmental Federalism
In the area of environmental regulation, the issue of preemption often arises because different levels of government rarely limit
themselves to what legal scholars have deemed to be their appropriate domains. 13 5 Some commentators argue that states have been at
the forefront of environmental policy for decades, but their leadership and experimentation are being threatened by expanding regulatory ceilings imposed via federal preemption. 3 6 Although every
130. See id. (evaluating consequences of Lease Cap Rules in terms of vehicle
emissions).
131. See Metro. Taxicab, 633 F. Supp. 2d at 105 (applying Supreme Court's
reasoning to facts of this case). For a discussion of the Supreme Court's justification for CAA preemption in Engine Manufacturers,see supra notes 82-84 and accompanying text.
132. See Metro. Taxicab, 633 F. Supp. 2d at 105 (conferring more weight to
practical effect of rules rather than their explicit terms).
133. See id. (relying on reasoning of Second Circuit in Cahill). For a discussion of the Second Circuit's analysis in Cahill see supra note 98.
134. See Metro. Taxicab, 633 F. Supp. 2d at 105 (finding Lease Cap Rules preempted by CAA).
135. See David E. Adelman & Kirsten H. Engel, Adaptive Federalism: The Case
Against ReallocatingEnvironmental Regulatory Authority, 92 MINN. L. REv. 1796, 1796
(2008) (describing incidence of preemption cases related to environmental
regulation).
136. See, e.g., Brian T. Burgess, Note, Limiting Preemption in EnvironmentalLaw:
An Analysis of the Cost-ExternalizationArgument and CaliforniaAssembly Bill 1493, 84
N.Y.U. L. REv. 258, 258 (2009) (criticizing increased occurrence of federal preemption). Federal laws that establish minimum environmental standards and preclude less stringent state measures create "federal floors," while federal laws that
prevent more protective state regulations establish "federal ceilings." See id. at 259.
"Federal ceiling preemption has expanded in environmental law as the result of
broad interpretations of existing statutes by courts and agencies as well as the enactment of new legislation by Congress expressly displacing state regulatory au-
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state took some action to address climate change by 2006, for example, the federal government has failed to follow suit in the face of
intense lobbying by industry groups to broaden the preemptive
137
force of existing environmental laws.
Other commentators support federal preemption on the
grounds that uniform, centralized regulation is easier on American
industries and more appropriate for tackling major environmental
challenges. 138 A middle ground approach advocates combined
roles for local, state, and federal governments in environmental
regulation because of the strengths each brings to the table. 13 9 The
benefits of overlapping jurisdictions include the ability of the federal government to speed the adoption of innovative policies developed by states, which have long been considered "laboratories of
democracy" with a valuable diversity of experience and
140
knowledge.
B.

Metropolitan Taxicab Decision Passes Inspection

Regardless of one's personal views on environmental federalism, there is little doubt that Metropolitan Taxicab properly applied
existing law to find the TLC's latest regulations preempted by the
EPCA and CAA. 141 Few cases previously touched upon EPCA preemption of local mileage regulations, but the Lease Cap Rules were
clearly related to fuel economy standards given the U.S. Supreme
Court's broad interpretation of related to.1 42 As two legal commenthority." Id. at 266. In general, both federal ceilings and floors prevent states from
tailoring regulations to their unique preferences and local conditions. See id. at
271.
137. See id. at 262, 268 (offering instance of states taking lead in environmental regulation where federal government has not acted).
138. See, e.g., Ludwiszewski & Haake, supra note 62, at 667 (touting federal
environmental regulation of global climate change over state regulation). Because
greenhouse gas emissions disperse throughout the atmosphere and cannot be contained within the jurisdiction where they are produced, for example, independent
state regulations would have little impact on the overall problem of global warming. See id. at 679. Those in favor of preemption also argue that it is more efficient
for businesses like automobile manufacturers to meet uniform federal standards
rather than fifty different state standards. See id. at 682.
139. See, e.g., Adelman & Engel, supra note 135, at 1831-33 (advocating dynamic system of concurrent jurisdiction for environmental regulation).
140. See id. at 1824-25, 1847-48 (discussing advantages to joint regulatory involvement by states and federal government). On more than one occasion, a new
environmental standard established by California was subsequently adopted by the
EPA as a national standard. Id. at 1840.
141. For a discussion of the district court's application of existing law, see
supra notes 117-34 and accompanying text.
142. For a discussion of the Supreme Court's interpretation of the phrase
.related to," see supra notes 85-90 and accompanying text.
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tators observed, "Longstanding Supreme Court precedents support
the breadth and inviolability of the EPCA's express preemption
provision. The Supreme Court has consistently held that preemption provisions 'related to' a particular field 'express a broad pre43
emptive purpose' and are 'clearly expansive.'",,

The EPCA's legislative history, although somewhat lacking,
lends support to a broad interpretation of its express preemption
clause. 144 The intended scope of this clause is never directly discussed, but Congress's rejection of more limited forms of preemption indicates that it intended the EPCA to broadly preempt all
nonfederal regulation of fuel economy.' 45 The original Senate bill
would only have preempted laws "inconsistent" with federal fuel
economy standards, while the original bill from the House of Representatives would have merely preempted those laws not "identical
to" federal requirements.1 4 6 Therefore, because Congress would
have used different language if it intended the EPCA to have narrow preemptive power, a broad interpretation of the preemption
47
clause as enacted is appropriate.'
The district court also adeptly found that the Lease Cap Rules
did not need to specifically include mileage standards to be preempted by the EPCA. 148 As the court in Goldstene noted, "The narrowest interpretation consistent with the plain language of [the]
EPCA's preemptive provision is that it encompasses only those state
regulations that are explicitly aimed at the establishment of fuel
economy standards, or that are the de facto equivalent of mileage
regulation .... ,,149 Not only did the financial mechanisms imposed
143. Ludwiszewski & Haake, supra note 62, at 689 (citing Morales v. Trans
World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 383-84 (1992); Egelhoff v. Egelhoff 532 U.S. 141,
146-47 (2001)) (summarizing Supreme Court's position on phrase related to in

connection with preemption cases).
144. See id. (evaluating legislative history of EPCA).
145. Id. (drawing inferences from legislative process culminating in EPCA).
146. See S. REP. No. 94-179, at 25 (1975); H.R. REP. No. 94-340, at 274 (1975)
(§ 507 as introduced, § 509 as reported) (revealing language in proposed EPCA
preemption provisions).
147. See Ophirv. City of Boston, 647 F. Supp. 2d 86, 94 (D. Mass. 2009) (discussing legislative history of EPCA). One likely reason why Congress rejected a narrower preemption clause was that it did not want to restrict consumers' purchase
options or cause adverse economic consequences to the automotive industry, both
concerns embodied in the existing statutory language. See 49 U.S.C. § 32902(f)
(2006) (listing factors that must be considered when setting maximum feasible
average fuel economy).
148. For a discussion of the district court's determination that the practical
consequences of the Lease Cap Rules outweigh the lack of overt mileage standards,
see supra notes 117-20 and accompanying text.
149. Cent. Valley Chrysler-Jeep,Inc. v. Goldstene, 529 F. Supp. 2d 1151, 1175 (E.D.
Cal. 2008) (describing two circumstances when EPCA preemption may apply).
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by the Lease Cap Rules revolve around the inherent difference in
fuel economy between conventional and hybrid taxicabs, but New
York City officials made it clear that the rules were targeted at improving the taxicab fleet's fuel efficiency.1 5 0 Thus, EPCA preemption of the Lease Cap Rules was appropriate because they were
51
unmistakably related to fuel economy standards.
While local regulations preempted by the EPCA are not necessarily preempted by the CAA, the court in Metropolitan Taxicab cor152
rectly held that the Lease Cap Rules were preempted by both.
Some have criticized the district court's 2008 ruling that found the
25/30 Rules preempted by the EPCA as misguided. 153 Yet, that decision was arguably generous to New York City in holding that CAA
preemption did not apply when the TLC's rules were silent on
emissions.' 54 Notwithstanding the holdings in Crombie and Goldstene, fuel economy standards are scientifically tantamount to vehicle emissions standards. 155 It follows logically that local regulations
ostensibly related to fuel economy are also related to vehicle emissions. 156 Accordingly, the court properly found that the CAA preempted the Lease Cap Rules even though they too failed to
157
specifically reference emissions standards.

150. For a discussion of the Lease Cap Rules' connection to fuel economy, see
supra notes 36, 42-47 and accompanying text.
151. For a discussion of the district court's ruling concerning EPCA preemption, see supra notes 117-25 and accompanying text.
152. For a discussion of the district court's ruling concerning CAA preemption, see supra notes 126-34 and accompanying text.
153. See Recent Case, Southern District of New York Holds that New York City Hybrid Taxi Regulations are Likely Preempted by the EPCA - Metropolitan Taxicab Board of
Trade v. City of New York, No. 08 Civ. 7837 (PAC), 2008 WL 4866021 (S.D.N.Y. Oct.
31, 2008), 122 HARv. L. REv. 2275, 2279-80 (2009) (arguing that court should have
interpreted "use" broadly in EPCA savings clause). This article claims that the 25/
30 Rules were related to fuel economy but should have been exempt from preemption because the taxicabs subject to the rules were obtained for New York City's
"own use." See id. at 2279.
154. See Opinion & Order, Metro. Taxicab Bd. of Trade v. City of New York, No.
08 Civ. 7837 (PAC), 2008 WL 4866021, at *14 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 31, 2008) (rejecting
CAA preemption because 25/30 Rules did not specifically say anything about
emissions).
155. For a discussion of the scientific link between fuel economy and vehicle
emissions standards, see supra note 97 and accompanying text.
156. See id. (supporting conclusion that vehicle emissions regulations are effectively fuel economy regulations).
157. For a discussion of the district court's holding regarding CAA preemption, see supra notes 126-34 and accompanying text.

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2010

23

Villanova Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 21, Iss. 2 [2010], Art. 4

348
C.

VILLANOVA ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JoumNAL

[Vol. XXI: p. 325

A Minor Speed Bump in the District Court's Analysis

One point that the court could have addressed more fully, although it would not have changed the outcome of the case, is the
traditional presumption against preemption. 158 Given Crombie's assessment that the regulation of vehicle emissions is not exclusively
an area of federal concern, courts seemingly cannot assert CAA or
EPCA preemption without explaining why such legislation does not
fall into a field traditionally occupied by the states. 15 9 Rather than
dodge the issue, the court in Metropolitan Taxicab could have discussed how there has been a significant federal presence in the regulation of fuel economy and vehicle emissions for decades even
though taxicab regulation is traditionally a local matter. 160 In addition, the court could have pointed to prior decisions where these
16 1
types of regulations were deemed to be of federal concern.
VI.

IMPACT

Considering the lack of case law addressing federal preemption of local fuel economy standards, Metropolitan Taxicab will likely
have a significant impact on environmental law pertaining to vehicles.1 62 This notion is bolstered by the fact that this case influenced
decisions in two other jurisdictions within barely three months of
being decided. 163 First, the District Court for the District of Massachusetts relied heavily on Metropolitan Taxicab to strike down a Boston ordinance that effectively mandated an all-hybrid taxicab fleet
158. For a discussion of the court's half-hearted approach to the presumption
against preemption, see supra note 124 and accompanying text.

159. For a discussion of the traditional presumption against preemption and
the relevant holding in Crombie, see supra notes 78-79, 95 and accompanying text.
160. See Ophirv. City of Boston, 647 F. Supp. 2d 86, 91-92 (D. Mass. 2009) (dem-

onstrating better way of addressing presumption against preemption). The presumption against preemption "is not triggered when a state regulates in an area
'where there has been a history of significant federal presence.'" Id. at 91 (quoting
United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 108 (2000)).
161. See, e.g., Green Mountain Chysler Plymouth Dodge Jeep v. Crombie, 508 F.
Supp. 2d 295, 354 (D. Vt. 2007) (describing Congress' intent with EPCA preemp-

tion clause). The fact that the EPCA and CAA both include broad express preemption clauses supports the notion that it was the clear and manifest purpose of
Congress to supersede the historic police powers of the state in these environmen-

tal areas. For the elements of the presumption against preemption, see supranotes
78-79 and accompanying text.

162. For a discussion of the lack of cases on point, see supra note 109 and
accompanying text.
163. See, e.g., Ophir, 647 F. Supp. 2d 86 (finding city ordinance likely pre-

empted by EPCA); Green Alliance Taxi Cab Ass'n v. King County, No.

C08-1048RAJ,

2009 WL 3185745 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 30, 2009) (permitting plaintiffs to amend
complaint to include EPCA preemption claim).
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by 2015.164 Subsequently, the District Court for the Western District of Washington used Metropolitan Taxicab to justify allowing two
taxicab associations to amend their complaint against the local government and include an additional claim of federal preemption
1 65
under the EPCA.

Following Metropolitan Taxicab, it will be nearly impossible for
cities and states to mandate the use of hybrids unless one of the
narrow exceptions to the EPCA and CAA preemption clauses is
met.' 6 6 Nevertheless, increasing social pressure and market realities make it likely that taxicab owners, as well as drivers among the
general population, will voluntarily transition to more fuel-efficient
vehicles. 16 7 As one environmentalist noted, "Every other industry
has faced the need to retool in light of technological innovations,
164. See Ophir, 647 F. Supp. 2d at 87-88 (providing facts of case). Boston Police Department Rule 403 required that every vehicle used as a taxicab as of August
29, 2008, "be a new Clean Taxi vehicle or must have been purchased before August
29, 2008." Id. As defined in the rule, only hybrid vehicles approved by the Hackney Carriage Unit of the Boston Police Department qualified as a "Clean Taxi." See
id. While Rule 403 did not explicitly require a minimum fuel economy, the court
found 403's requirement to be more stringent than that of the Lease Cap Rules
and thus preempted by the EPCA. See id. at 91, 94. Hailing Metropolitan Taxicab as
persuasive and well-reasoned, the Ophir court cautioned that Boston "has a long
row to hoe." Id. at 91.
165. See Green Alliance, 2009 WL 3185745, at *5-6 (describing rationale for allowing amended complaint). The plaintiffs originally sued King County and the
City of Seattle to challenge a new county rule establishing requirements that taxicab associations must satisfy to participate in a test project and receive additional
taxicab licenses. See id. at *1. Although the court granted the defendants' motion
for summary judgment, it found that a new claim under the EPCA would not be
futile in light of Metropolitan Taxicab. See id. at *6. In particular, the plaintiffs argued that the county rule was preempted by the EPCA because one of its requirements is that the selected associations agree to purchase hybrid vehicles. See id. at
*5.
166. For a discussion of the preemption provisions and related exceptions
within the EPCA and CAA, see supra notes 66-72 and accompanying text. In addition to the exceptions provided in these statutes, "[a]ctions taken by a state or
political subdivision may not be preempted in some circumstances where the state
acts as a market participant, rather than as a market regulator." Metro. Taxicab
Opinion, 2008 WL 4866021, at *7 (citing Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Associated
Builders & Contractors, Inc., 507 U.S. 210, 227 (1993)). It is difficult to qualify for
the market participant doctrine, however, because governments act much more
frequently as regulators than as industry participants. See id. at *10-11.
167. SeeJonathan Saltzman, Hybrid Mandatefor Taxis Reversed, BOSTON GLOBE,
Aug. 15, 2009, http://www.boston.com/lifestyle/green/articles/2009/08/15/hybridmandate for taxisreversed/ (suggesting market realities will ultimately result in more hybrid taxicabs); Richard Stengel, For American Consumers, a
Responsibility Revolution, TIME, Sept. 10, 2009, http://www.time.com/time/nation/
arficle/0,8599,1921444,00.html (describing rise of ethical consumerism in U.S.).
Perhaps due to differences in local culture, the introduction of hybrid taxicabs has
gone more smoothly in cities such as San Francisco and Denver than in New York
and Boston. See Kate Galbraith, Boston, Other Cities Debate Hybrid Taxis, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 1, 2009, http://greeninc.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/04/01 /boston-other-cities-
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and so must the taxi industry."'16 8 By the time Metropolitan Taxicab
was decided, hybrids accounted for approximately sixteen percent
of New York City's taxicab fleet, some 2,060 taxicabs. 169 This number marked a nearly thirty-seven percent increase in the number of
hybrid taxicabs in the city in just six months. 170 Regardless of existing fuel economy and emissions standards, it appears that the dismal state of the economy and dramatic fluctuations in the cost of
gasoline have caused a natural market shift toward vehicles with
171
better fuel economy and lower emissions.
Although federal inaction on major environmental issues created a regulatory void that many cities and states have attempted to
fill, Metropolitan Taxicab reveals the hurdles facing state and local
initiatives. 172 In terms of improving vehicle fuel economy and emissions, cities and states may have to wait for results to materialize
from the Energy Policy and Security Act of 2007173 or President

174
Barack Obama's proposed new policy on national fuel efficiency.

debate-hybrid-taxis/ (comparing opposition by taxicab industry to hybrid requirements in New York City and Boston).
168. George Bachrach, The Greening of Boston's Taxi Fleet, BOSTON GLOBE, July
12, 2008, http://www.boston.com/bostonglobe/editorial-opinion/oped/articles/
2008/07/12/thegreening-ofbostons taxi fleet/ (advocating reasons why Boston taxicab owners should embrace buying hybrids).
169. See Metro. Taxicab Bd. of Trade v. City of New York, 633 F. Supp. 2d 83, 89
(S.D.N.Y. 2009) (offering statistics regarding number of hybrid taxicabs in New
York City).
170. For a discussion of the number of hybrid taxicabs in New York City at the
time of the district court's 2008 decision, see supranote 25 and accompanying text.
171. See Burgess, supra note 136, at 295 (discussing natural market shift toward hybrid vehicles).
172. See Klass, supra note 80, at 1682 (describing policy void created by EPA's
failure to even attempt limiting greenhouse gas emissions). When the federal government failed to curb greenhouse gas emissions, various northeastern and midAtlantic states banded together to establish a cap-and-trade system to reduce power
plant emissions. See Dean Scott, Legislation: Governors Urge Congress to Set Carbon Cap
but Want to Protect States from Preemption, ENV'T REP., (BNA) No. 38 ER 2452 (Nov.
16, 2007) (explaining creation of Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative). Numerous
western states likewise launched an initiative to curb greenhouse gas emissions in
their region of the country. See id. (relating formation of Western Climate
Initiative).
173. See Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-140,
§ 102, 121 Stat. 1492, 1499 (2007) (increasing average fuel economy beginning
with model year 2020). Congress passed this legislation to reduce America's dependence on oil by increasing CAFE standards on new cars and trucks to thirty-five
mpg by model year 2020. See FuelEconomy.gov, Reduce Oil Dependence Costs,
http://www.fueleconomy.gov/feg/oildep.shtml
(last visited Feb. 28, 2010)
(describing justification and projected effect of Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007). It is estimated that this change could reduce U.S. petroleum
consumption by twenty-five billion gallons by 2030. Id.
174. For a discussion of President Obama's proposal to raise fuel economy
standards, see supra note 124.
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Should cities and states not wish to merely sit in traffic, however, an
alternative route might entail creating incentives to encourage the
use of hybrid vehicles. 175 In order to increase the number of fuelefficient taxicabs in particular, governments may release additional
taxicab licenses exclusively to hybrids or offer financial rewards for
switching to hybrids. 176 The validity of such policies is dubious following Metropolitan Taxicab, but the taxicab industry appears less inclined to mount a legal challenge when the government
17 7
encourages green behavior using carrots rather than sticks.
The Bloomberg administration has already appealed the Metropolitan Taxicab decision to the Second Circuit, but reversal is unlikely unless existing federal law is amended or replaced.178 Critics
argue that the EPCA and CAA preemption provisions and savings
clauses, largely unchanged since the 1970s, are outdated because
Congress did not contemplate many of today's environmental is-

175. For examples of incentives used by New York City to promote the use of
hybrid taxicabs, see supra note 106. Even President Obama seems to be getting
impatient with Congress's failure to pass comprehensive environmental legislation.
See John M. Broder, E.P.A. Moves to Curtail Greenhouse Gas Emissions, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 30, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/01/science/earth/Olepa.html
(detailing Obama Administration moving forward with new rules to regulate
greenhouse gas emissions from power plants and large industrial facilities). In
August 2009, the Obama Administration awarded more than $2 billion in grants
from the economic stimulus package to give the U.S. a leg up in the production of
fuel-efficient vehicles. See Matthew L. Wald, $2 Billion in Grants to Bolster U.S. Manufacturing of Parts for Electric Vehicles, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 5, 2009, http://
www.nytimes.com/2009/08/06/business/06battery.html
(providing recipients
and objectives of grants geared toward nascent electric car industry). The Obama
Administration also paved the way for greater EPA regulation of emissions from
vehicles and other sources by issuing an "endangerment finding" in December
2009 regarding carbon dioxide and five other greenhouse gases. See H. Josef Herbert & Dina Cappiello, Historic EPA Finding: Greenhouse Gases Harm Humans, ABC
NEWS, Dec. 7, 2009, http://abcnews.go.com/Business/wireStory?id=9268865 (relating EPA announcement that man-made greenhouse gases should be reduced
because they threaten public health and welfare).
176. For examples of hybrid incentives that have been embraced by the taxicab industry, see supra note 106.
177. For further discussion demonstrating the attractiveness of incentives and
disincentives, see supra note 106.
178. See Posting of Amy Garber to Global Climate Law Blog, http://
www.globalclimatelaw.com/2009/07/articles/climate-change-litigation/new-yorkcity-hybrid-taxi-plan-winding-its-way-through-court/ (July 21, 2009) (discussing Metropolitan Taxicab decision and subsequent appeal by New York City). Although the
Bloomberg administration prevailed over various state law-based claims against the
Lease Cap Rules, the trial court acknowledged that its decision does not affect
whether the TLC's regulations are preempted by federal law. See Metro. Taxicab Bd.
of Trade v. New York City Taxi & Limousine Comm'n, No. 110594/09, 2009 WL
4016650, at *8 (N.Y. Sup. Nov. 18, 2009) (holding that TLC acted appropriately
within its authority regardless of whether regulations are preempted).
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sues. 179 Yet, it is uncertain whether fundamental policy change can
be achieved in the near future. 180 Despite support by state and local officials for bold new federal environmental regulations, the influence of industry organizations is strong and disagreement
persists over the role of federal preemption in any new legislation. 18 1 The failings of global climate change negotiations in Copenhagen and acrimony in Congress resulting from the debate over
health care reform further complicate efforts to overhaul federal
environmental laws. 182 As long as the current regulatory framework
remains, Metropolitan Taxicab serves as a significant impediment to
cities and states on the road to going green.
Paul Liebeskind*
179. See Klass, supra note 80, at 1671-72 (expressing negative opinion of EPCA
and CAA shared by some). According to critics, greater scientific evidence about
the scope and origin of major environmental challenges, such as climate change,
underscores the need for updated federal legislation. See id. at 1682.
180. See States Unite to Oppose Industry Efforts to Preempt GHG Programs, CLEAN
AIR REp., Aug. 23, 2007, 2007 WLNR 16316710 [hereinafter CLEAN AIR RP.] (discussing resistance of many state officials to continued federal preemption in realm
of environmental regulation). In June 2009, the House of Representatives passed
sweeping legislation, dubbed the American Clean Energy and Security Act, "intended to address global warming and transform the way the nation produces and
uses energy." John M. Broder, House Passes Bill to Address Threat of Climate Change,
N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/27/us/politics/
27climate.html (reporting on House passage of much-anticipated climate change
bill). The outlook for this legislation is bleak, however, because climate change
has been pushed to the backburner as Congress addresses other pressing domestic
issues. See id. Moreover, sharp political divisions and regional differences in the
Senate make passage difficult. See id.
181. See CLEAN AIR REP., supra note 180 (portraying contest between proponents of strong climate change legislation and lobbyists of polluting industries).
The National Governors Association and National Council of State Legislatures,
both representing officials from across the political spectrum, have spoken out
against federal preemption. See id. Simultaneously, "many industry organizations
have made federal preemption one of their top legislative priorities for any climate
change bill." Id. The result is mixed signals from federal lawmakers regarding
their positions on federal preemption. See id.
182. See Peter Baker, Compromising on 2 Issues, Obama Gets Partial Wins, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 19, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/20/us/politics/
20obama.html (describing how President Obama's policy agenda on health care
and climate change reform has given way to imperfect political compromises).
While nearly all of the countries attending the United Nations climate change convention in Copenhagen, Denmark agreed to back an interim accord forged on the
final day of negotiations, many were disappointed that a stronger, binding agreement could not be reached. See Andrew C. Revkin &John M. Broder, A Grudging
Accord in Climate Talks, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/
12/20/science/earth/20accord.html (discussing international agreement to begin
taking certain actions to address global warming).
* J.D. Candidate, 2011, Villanova University School of Law; B.A., 2008,
Georgetown University.
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